Iran may change: it's time for action not for sanctions

By Bahman Baktiari - If the Iranian rulers had hoped that they'd finally gotten opposition protesters under control after the June 2009 disputed elections, the recent demonstrations should have disabused them. The latest protests have shaken the Iranian establishment, plunging it into the worst political crisis it has ever seen.

What has become clear now is that the Iranian regime is facing more than just an intensification of factional warfare within the Iranian political system. It is confronted with an opposition movement that is both exceptionally resilient and spreading. The next few months will be crucial for the regime, particularly its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

What started out as a loose-knit coalition of reformist groups, led by defeated opposition candidates protesting rampant fraud in the presidential election, is becoming bolder, more focused and angrier by the week. No longer limited to the presidential election, their protests reject the regime itself, deepening the crisis of legitimacy the leadership has suffered since June. Moreover, there are rifts in the clerical circle; for the first time ever, well-respected Shi'a scholars are voicing their opposition.

After the latest street demonstration in which at least 12 people and probably many more died and over 1,500 were arrested, it is clear that Iranian authorities continue to underestimate the mood of the country, accusing the opposition leaders of "sedition," calling for their execution and arrests.

Although Mir Hossein Mousavi and the other leading reformists (former president Mohammad Khatami and Mehdi Karroubi, the second presidential candidate) remain symbols of the opposition, and their refusal to call for an end to popular protests has been a huge irritant to the authorities, their imprisonment and execution will not bring an end to demonstrations against the regime.

What has shaken the regime and could pose a serious threat is the growing rift in the clerical establishment. Senior clerical figures refused to accept Khamenei's announcement of the end of the holy month of Ramadan, insisting that it should be a day later than the one he had set.

In November, Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi Amoli, considered to be one of the pillars of the Qom seminary, resigned his role as Friday prayer leader, hinting that "people have problems" that he could not address from such a platform.

When a senior cleric and a major critic of the regime, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, died in December, Khamenei issued a cold condolence message admonishing Montazeri for some of the "mistakes" he had made. Montazeri had proved a consistent critic of the regime, arguing against the unquestioned authority of the Supreme Ruler and condemning the disputed election as a fraud on the people and a betrayal of the principles of the revolution.

All of this underlines how support for the regime has been eroding in the past six months, and this has emboldened the opposition.

Hard-core elements and the Revolutionary Guards are scrambling for ways to quell the discontent. They have started a second "cultural revolution" in the universities and are looking at an overhaul of education. They plan to open 6,000 bases for the basij youth militia at primary schools, as well as sending in "political training teachers" and supportive clerics. It has created a new police unit to sweep the Internet for dissident voices, and the Revolutionary Guards plan to open a news agency with print, photo and television components.

The United States and its European allies must not lose sight of the internal developments in Iran when contemplating additional sanctions. Sanctions bills threatening interdiction of gasoline shipments to Iran were passed overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives and will pass with equal margins in the Senate.

However, in light of the current internal uprising against the regime, these sanctions will punish the Iranian people and weaken their resolve and participation in the protest movement. Furthermore, sanctions of this kind would only enrich and empower the Revolutionary Guards, and identify the U.S. as the enemy of the ordinary citizen in Iran. A more sensible approach is to pursue targeted sanctions against the Revolutionary Guards rather than the average Iranian citizen.

The 1979 revolution in Iran could not have occurred without a broad coalition of liberals, clerics, students, women, business and labor supporters.

However, the foundations of the Islamic regime have already been exposed as weak, and years of economic mismanagement, political repression, rampant corruption and international adventurism seem to have taken their toll on the regime.

The current opposition movement has not yet reached the level of 1978-79, but it is expanding and has the potential to bring about major changes inside Iran.

Bahman Baktiari is director of the Middle East Center at the University of Utah.